PQUIP A. Banerjee
Internet-Draft T. Reddy
Intended status: Informational D. Schoinianakis
Expires: 11 February 2024 Nokia
T. Hollebeek
DigiCert
10 August 2023
Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers
draft-ar-pquip-pqc-engineers-03
Abstract
The presence of a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)
would render state-of-the-art, public-key cryptography deployed today
obsolete, since all the assumptions about the intractability of the
mathematical problems that offer confident levels of security today
no longer apply in the presence of a CRQC. This means there is a
requirement to update protocols and infrastructure to use post-
quantum algorithms, which are public-key algorithms designed to be
secure against CRQCs as well as classical computers. These
algorithms are just like previous public key algorithms, however the
intractable mathematical problems have been carefully chosen, so they
are hard for CRQCs as well as classical computers. This document
explains why engineers need to be aware of and understand post-
quantum cryptography. It emphasizes the potential impact of CRQCs on
current cryptographic systems and the need to transition to post-
quantum algorithms to ensure long-term security. The most important
thing to understand is that this transition is not like previous
transitions from DES to AES or from SHA-1 to SHA2, as the algorithm
properties are significantly different from classical algorithms, and
a drop-in replacement is not possible.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ar-pquip-pqc/.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Contributing to This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Traditional Cryptographic Primitives that Could Be Replaced by
PQC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Invariants of Post-Quantum Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. NIST PQC Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. NIST candidates selected for standardization . . . . . . 7
6.1.1. PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) . . . . . . . 7
6.1.2. PQC Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. Candidates advancing to the fourth-round for
standardization at NIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Threat of CRQCs on Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Symmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Asymmetric cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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8. Timeline for transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Post-quantum cryptography categories . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.1. Lattice-Based Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Hash-Based Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.3. Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. KEMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. What is a KEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1.1. Interactivity in PQC KEM and Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key
Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.2. HPKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.3. Security property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11. PQC Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. What is a Post-quantum Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.2. Security property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.3. Details of FALCON, Dilithium, and SPHINCS+ . . . . . . . 15
11.4. Details of XMSS and LMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.5. Hash-then-Sign Versus Sign-then-Hash . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. Recommendations for Security / Performance Tradeoffs . . . . 18
13. Comparing PQC KEMs/Signatures vs Traditional KEMs
(KEXs)/Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14. Post-Quantum and Traditional Hybrid Schemes . . . . . . . . . 22
14.1. PQ/T Hybrid Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.2. PQ/T Hybrid Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.3. Additional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.1. Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.2. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
15.3. Hybrid Key Exchange : Bridging the Gap Between
Post-Quantum and Traditional Cryptography . . . . . . . 26
16. Further Reading & Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
16.1. Reading List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
16.2. Developer Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
17. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Introduction
Quantum computing is no longer perceived as a conjecture of
computational sciences and theoretical physics. Considerable
research efforts and enormous corporate and government funding for
the development of practical quantum computing systems are being
invested currently. For instance, Google’s announcement on achieving
quantum supremacy [Google], IBM’s latest 433-qubit processor Osprey
[IBM] or even Nokia Bell Labs' work on topological qubits [Nokia]
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signify, among other outcomes, the accelerating efforts towards
large-scale quantum computers. At the time of writing the document,
Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs) that can break
widely used public-key cryptographic algorithms are not yet
available. However, it is worth noting that there is ongoing
research and development in the field of quantum computing, with the
goal of building more powerful and scalable quantum computers. As
quantum technology advances, there is the potential for future
quantum computers to have a significant impact on current
cryptographic systems. Forecasting the future is difficult, but the
general consensus is that such computers might arrive some time in
the 2030s, or might not arrive until 2050 or later.
Extensive research has produced several post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms that offer the potential to ensure cryptography's survival
in the quantum computing era. However, transitioning to a post-
quantum infrastructure is not a straightforward task, and there are
numerous challenges to overcome. It requires a combination of
engineering efforts, proactive assessment and evaluation of available
technologies, and a careful approach to product development. This
document aims to provide general guidance to engineers who utilize
public-key cryptography in their software. It covers topics such as
selecting appropriate post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms,
understanding the differences between PQC Key Encapsulation
Mechanisms (KEMs) and traditional Diffie-Hellman style key exchange,
and provides insights into expected key sizes and processing time
differences between PQC algorithms and traditional ones.
Additionally, it discusses the potential threat to symmetric
cryptography from Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers
(CRQCs). It is important to remember that asymmetric algorithms are
largely used for secure communications between organizations that may
not have previously interacted, so a significant amount of
coordination between organizations, and within and between ecosystems
needs to be taken into account. Such transitions are some of the
most complicated in the tech industry. It might be worth mentioning
that recently NSA released an article on Future Quantum-Resistant
(QR) Algorithm Requirements for National Security Systems [CNSA2-0]
based on the need to protect against deployments of CRQCs in the
future.
It is crucial for the reader to understand that when the word "PQC"
is mentioned in the document, it means Asymmetric Cryptography (or
Public key Cryptography) and not any algorithms from the Symmetric
side based on stream, block ciphers, etc. It does not cover such
topics as when traditional algorithms might become vulnerable (for
that, see documents such as [QC-DNS] and others). It also does not
cover unrelated technologies like Quantum Key Distribution or Quantum
Key Generation, which use quantum hardware to exploit quantum effects
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to protect communications and generate keys, respectively. Post-
quantum cryptography is based on standard math and software and can
be run on any general purpose computer.
Please note: This document does not go into the deep mathematics of
the PQC algorithms, but rather provides an overview to engineers on
the current threat landscape and the relevant algorithms designed to
help prevent those threats.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Contributing to This Document
The guide was inspired by a thread in September 2022 on the
pqc@ietf.org (mailto:pqc@ietf.org) mailing list. The document is
being collaborated on through a GitHub repository
(https://github.com/tireddy2/pqc-for-engineers).
The editors actively encourage contributions to this document.
Please consider writing a section on a topic that you think is
missing. Short of that, writing a paragraph or two on an issue you
found when writing code that uses PQC would make this document more
useful to other coders. Opening issues that suggest new material is
fine too, but relying on others to write the first draft of such
material is much less likely to happen than if you take a stab at it
yourself.
4. Traditional Cryptographic Primitives that Could Be Replaced by PQC
Any asymmetric cryptographic algorithm based on integer
factorization, finite field discrete logarithms or elliptic curve
discrete logarithms will be vulnerable to attacks using Shor's
Algorithm on a sufficiently large general-purpose quantum computer,
known as a CRQC. This document focuses on the principal functions of
asymmetric cryptography:
* Key Agreement: Key Agreement schemes are used to establish a
shared cryptographic key for secure communication. They are one
of the mechanisms that can be replaced by PQC, as this is based on
public key cryptography and is therefore vulnerable to the Shor's
algorithm. An CRQC can find the prime factors of the large public
key, which can be used to derive the private key.
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* Digital Signatures: Digital Signature schemes are used to
authenticate the identity of a sender, detect unauthorized
modifications to data and underpin trust in a system. Similar to
Key Agreement, signatures also depend on public-private key pair
and hence a break in public key cryptography will also affect
traditional digital signatures, hence the importance of developing
post quantum digital signatures.
5. Invariants of Post-Quantum Cryptography
In the context of PQC, symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms are
generally not directly impacted by quantum computing advancements.
Symmetric-key cryptography, such as block ciphers (e.g., AES) and
message authentication mechanisms (e.g., HMAC-SHA2), rely on secret
keys shared between the sender and receiver. HMAC is a specific
construction that utilizes a cryptographic hash function (such as
SHA-2) and a secret key shared between the sender and receiver to
produce a message authentication code. CRQCs, in theory, do not
offer substantial advantages in breaking symmetric-key algorithms
compared to classical computers (see Section 7.1 for more details).
6. NIST PQC Algorithms
In 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
started a process to solicit, evaluate, and standardize one or more
quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms, as seen here
(https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography). The
first set of algorithms for standardization
(https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/nistir/8413/final) were
selected in July 2022.
NIST announced as well that they will be opening a fourth round
(https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/post-quantum-
cryptography/documents/round-4/guidelines-for-submitting-tweaks-
fourth-round.pdf) to standardize an alternative KEM, and a call
(https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/pqc-dig-sig/documents/
call-for-proposals-dig-sig-sept-2022.pdf) for new candidates for a
post-quantum signature algorithm.
These algorithms are not a drop-in replacement for classical
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. RSA [RSA] and ECC [RFC6090] can
be used for both key encapsulation and signatures, while for post-
quantum algorithms, a different algorithm is needed for each. When
upgrading protocols, it is important to replace the existing use of
classical algorithms with either a PQC key encapsulation method or a
PQC signature method, depending on how RSA and/or ECC was previously
being used.
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6.1. NIST candidates selected for standardization
6.1.1. PQC Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs)
* CRYSTALS-Kyber (https://pq-crystals.org/kyber/): Kyber is a module
learning with errors (MLWE)-based key encapsulation mechanism
(Section 9.1).
6.1.2. PQC Signatures
* CRYSTALS-Dilithium (https://pq-crystals.org/dilithium/): CRYSTALS-
Dilithium is a lattice signature scheme (Section 9.1 and
Section 11.3).
* Falcon (https://falcon-sign.info/): Falcon is a lattice signature
scheme (Section 9.1 and Section 11.3).
* SPHINCS+ (https://sphincs.org/): SPHINCS+ is a stateless hash-
based signature scheme (Section 9.2 and Section 11.3).
6.2. Candidates advancing to the fourth-round for standardization at
NIST
The fourth-round of the NIST process focuses only on KEMs. The goal
of that round is to select an althernative algorithm that is based on
different hard problem than Kyber. The candidates still advancing
for standardization are:
* Classic McEliece (https://classic.mceliece.org/): Based on the
hardness of syndrome decoding of Goppa codes. Goppa codes are a
class of error-correcting codes that can correct a certain number
of errors in a transmitted message. The decoding problem involves
recovering the original message from the received noisy codeword.
* BIKE (https://bikesuite.org/): Based on the the hardness of
syndrome decoding of QC-MDPC codes. Quasi-Cyclic Moderate Density
Parity Check (QC-MDPC) code are a class of error correcting codes
that leverages bit flipping technique to efficiently correct
errors.
* HQC (http://pqc-hqc.org/) : Based on the hardness of syndrome
decoding of Quasi-cyclic concatenated Reed Muller Reed Solomon
(RMRS) codes in the Hamming metric. Reed Muller (RM) codes are a
class of block error correcting codes used especially in wireless
and deep space communications. Reed Solomon (RS) are a class of
block error correcting codes that are used to detect and correct
multiple bit errors.
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* SIKE (https://sike.org/) (Broken): Supersingular Isogeny Key
Encapsulation (SIKE) is a specific realization of the SIDH
(Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman) protocol. Recently, a
mathematical attack (https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/975.pdf) based
on the "glue-and-split" theorem from 1997 from Ernst Kani was
found against the underlying chosen starting curve and torsion
information. In practical terms, this attack allows for the
efficient recovery of the private key. NIST announced that SIKE
was no longer under consideration, but the authors of SIKE had
asked for it to remain in the list so that people are aware that
it is broken.
7. Threat of CRQCs on Cryptography
Post-quantum cryptography or quantum-safe cryptography refers to
cryptographic algorithms that are secure against cryptographic
attacks from both CRQCs and classic computers.
When considering the security risks associated with the ability of a
quantum computer to attack traditional cryptography, it is important
to distinguish between the impact on symmetric algorithms and public-
key ones. Dr. Peter Shor and Dr. Lov Grover developed two algorithms
that changed the way the world thinks of security under the presence
of a CRQC.
7.1. Symmetric cryptography
Grover's algorithm is a quantum search algorithm that provides a
theoretical quadratic speedup for searching an unstructured database
compared to classical algorithms. Grover’s algorithm theoretically
requires doubling the key sizes of the algorithms that one deploys
today to achieve quantum resistance. This is because Grover’s
algorithm reduces the amount of operations to break 128-bit symmetric
cryptography to 2^{64} quantum operations, which might sound
computationally feasible. However, 2^{64} operations performed in
parallel are feasible for modern classical computers, but 2^{64}
quantum operations performed serially in a quantum computer are not.
Grover's algorithm is highly non-parallelizable and even if one
deploys 2^c computational units in parallel to brute-force a key
using Grover's algorithm, it will complete in time proportional to
2^{(128−c)/2}, or, put simply, using 256 quantum computers will only
reduce runtime by 1/16, 1024 quantum computers will only reduce
runtime by 1/32 and so forth (see [NIST] and [Cloudflare]).
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For unstructured data such as symmetric encrypted data or
cryptographic hashes, although CRQCs can search for specific
solutions across all possible input combinations (e.g., Grover's
Algorithm), no CRQCs is known to break the security properties of
these classes of algorithms.
How can someone be sure that an improved algorithm won’t outperform
Grover's algorithm at some point in time? Christof Zalka has shown
that Grover's algorithm (and in particular its non-parallel nature)
achieves the best possible complexity for unstructured search
[Grover-search].
Finally, in their evaluation criteria for PQC, NIST is considering a
security level equivalent to that of AES-128, meaning that NIST has
confidence in standardizing parameters for PQC that offer similar
levels of security as AES-128 does [NIST]. As a result, 128-bit
algorithms should be considered quantum-safe for many years to come.
7.2. Asymmetric cryptography
“Shor’s algorithm” on the other side, efficiently solves the integer
factorization problem (and the related discrete logarithm problem),
which offer the foundations of the public-key cryptography that the
world uses today. This implies that, if a CRQC is developed, today’s
public-key cryptography algorithms (e.g., RSA, Diffie-Hellman and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography) and protocols would need to be replaced
by algorithms and protocols that can offer cryptanalytic resistance
against CRQCs. Note that Shor’s algorithm doesn’t run on any classic
computer, it needs a CRQC.
For example, to provide some context, one would need 20 million noisy
qubits to break RSA-2048 in 8 hours [RSA8HRS] or 4099 stable qubits
to break it in 10 seconds [RSA10SC].
For structured data such as public-key and signatures, instead, CRQCs
can fully solve the underlying hard problems used in classic
cryptography (see Shor's Algorithm). Because an increase of the size
of the key-pair would not provide a secure solution in this case, a
complete replacement of the algorithm is needed. Therefore, post-
quantum public-key cryptography must rely on problems that are
different from the ones used in classic public-key cryptography
(i.e., the integer factorization problem, the finite-field discrete
logarithm problem, and the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm
problem).
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8. Timeline for transition
A malicious actor with adequate resources can launch an attack to
store sensitive encrypted data today that can be decrypted once a
CRQC is available. This implies that, every day, sensitive encrypted
data is susceptible to the attack by not implementing quantum-safe
strategies, as it corresponds to data being deciphered in the future.
+------------------------+----------------------------+
| | |
| y | x |
+------------------------+----------+-----------------+
| | <--------------->
| z | Security gap
+-----------------------------------+
Figure 1: Mosca model
These challenges are illustrated nicely by the so called Mosca model
discussed in [Threat-Report]. In the Figure 1, "x" denotes the time
that our systems and data need to remain secure, "y" the number of
years to migrate to a PQC infrastructure and "z" the time until a
CRQC that can break current cryptography is available. The model
assumes that encrypted data can be intercepted and stored before the
migration is completed in "y" years. This data remains vulnerable
for the complete "x" years of their lifetime, thus the sum "x+y"
gives us an estimate of the full timeframe that data remain insecure.
The model essentially asks how are we preparing our IT systems during
those "y" years (or in other words, how can one minimize those "y"
years) to minimize the transition phase to a PQC infrastructure and
hence minimize the risks of data being exposed in the future.
Finally, other factors that could accelerate the introduction of a
CRQC should not be under-estimated, like for example faster-than-
expected advances in quantum computing and more efficient versions of
Shor’s algorithm requiring less qubits. As an example, IBM, one of
the leading actors in the development of a large-scale quantum
computer, has recently published a roadmap committing to new quantum
processors supporting more than 1000 qubits by 2025 and networked
systems with 10k-100k qubits beyond 2026 [IBMRoadmap]. Innovation
often comes in waves, so it is to the industry’s benefit to remain
vigilant and prepare as early as possible.
9. Post-quantum cryptography categories
The current set of problems used in post-quantum cryptography can be
currently grouped into three different categories: lattice-based,
hash-based and code-based.
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9.1. Lattice-Based Public-Key Cryptography
Lattice-based public-key cryptography leverages the simple
construction of lattices (i.e., a regular collection of points in a
Euclidean space that are regularly spaced) to build problems that are
hard to solve such as the Shortest Vector or Closes Vector Problem,
Learning with Errors, and Learning with Rounding. All these problems
have good proof for worst-to-average case reduction, thus equating
the hardness of the average case to the worst-case.
The possibility to implement public-key schemes on lattices is tied
to the characteristics of the basis used for the lattice. In
particular, solving any of the mentioned problems can be easy when
using reduced or "good" basis (i.e., as short as possible and as
orthogonal as possible), while it becomes computationally infeasible
when using "bad" basis (i.e., long vectors not orthogonal). Although
the problem might seem trivial, it is computationally hard when
considering many dimensions. Therefore, a typical approach is to use
"bad" basis for public keys and "good" basis for private keys. The
public keys ("bad" basis) let you easily verify signatures by
checking, for example, that a vector is the closest or smallest, but
do not let you solve the problem (i.e., finding the vector).
Conversely, private keys (i.e., the "good" basis) can be used for
generating the signatures (e.g., finding the specific vector).
Signing is equivalent to solving the lattice problem.
Lattice-based schemes usually have good performances and average size
public keys and signatures, making them good candidates for general-
purpose use such as replacing the use of RSA in PKIX certificates.
Examples of such class of algorithms include Kyber, Falcon and
Dilithium.
It is noteworthy that, lattice-based encryption schemes are often
prone to decryption failures, meaning that valid encryptions are
decrypted incorrectly; as such, an attacker could significantly
reduce the security of lattice-based schemes that have a relatively
high failure rate. However, for most of the NIST Post-Quantum
Proposals, the number of required oracle queries is above practical
limits, as has been shown in [LattFail1]. More recent works have
improved upon the results in [LattFail1], showing that the cost of
searching for additional failing ciphertexts after one or more have
already been found, can be sped up dramatically [LattFail2].
Nevertheless, at this point in time (July 2023), the PQC candidates
by NIST are considered secure under these attacks and we suggest
constant monitoring as cryptanalysis research is ongoing.
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9.2. Hash-Based Public-Key Cryptography
Hash based PKC has been around since the 70s, developed by Lamport
and Merkle which creates a digital signature algorithm and its
security is mathematically based on the security of the selected
cryptographic hash function. Many variants of hash based signatures
have been developed since the 70s including the recent XMSS
[RFC8391], HSS/LMS [RFC8554] or BPQS schemes. Unlike digital
signature techniques, most hash-based signature schemes are stateful,
which means that signing necessitates the update of the secret key.
SPHINCS on the other hand leverages the HORS (Hash to Obtain Random
Subset) technique and remains the only hash based signature scheme
that is stateless.
SPHINCS+ is an advancement on SPHINCS which reduces the signature
sizes in SPHINCS and makes it more compact. SPHINCS+ was recently
standardized by NIST.
9.3. Code-Based Public-Key Cryptography
This area of cryptography stemmed in the 1970s and 80s based on the
seminal work of McEliece and Niederreiter which focuses on the study
of cryptosystems based on error-correcting codes. Some popular error
correcting codes include the Goppa codes (used in McEliece
cryptosystems), encoding and decoding syndrome codes used in Hamming
Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) or Quasi-cyclic Moderate density parity check (QC-
MDPC) codes.
Examples include all the NIST Round 4 (unbroken) finalists: Classic
McEliece, HQC, BIKE.
10. KEMs
10.1. What is a KEM
Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is a cryptographic technique used
for securely exchanging symmetric keys between two parties over an
insecure channel. It is commonly used in hybrid encryption schemes,
where a combination of asymmetric (public-key) and symmetric
encryption is employed. The KEM encapsulation results in a fixed-
length symmetric key that can be used in one of two ways: (1) Derive
a Data Encryption Key (DEK) to encrypt the data (2) Derive a Key
Encryption Key (KEK) used to wrap the DEK.
KEM relies on the following primitives [PQCAPI]:
* def kemKeyGen() -> (pk, sk)
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* def kemEncaps(pk) -> (ct, ss)
* def kemDecaps(ct, sk) -> ss
where pk is public key, sk is secret key, ct is the ciphertext
representing an encapsulated key, and ss is shared secret. The
following figure illustrates a sample flow of KEM:
+---------+ +---------+
| Client | | Server |
+---------+ +---------+
-----------------------\ | |
| sk, pk = kemKeyGen() |-| |
|----------------------| | |
| |
| pk |
|---------->|
| | -------------------------\
| |-| ss, ct = kemEncaps(pk) |
| | |------------------------|
| |
| ct |
|<----------|
-------------------------\ | |
| ss = kemDecaps(ct, sk) |-| |
|------------------------| | |
| |
10.1.1. Interactivity in PQC KEM and Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange
PQ KEMs are interactive in nature because it involves back-and-forth
communication to negotiate and establish the shared secret key and
unlike Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key exchange (KEX) which provides non-
interactive key exchange (NIKE) property. NIKE is a cryptographic
primitive which enables two parties, who know each others public
keys, to agree on a symmetric shared key without requiring any
interaction. The following figure illustrates a sample flow of DH:
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+---------+ +---------+
| Client | | Server |
+---------+ +---------+
-----------------------\ | |
| sk1, pk1 = KeyGen() |-| |
|----------------------| | |
| |
| pk1 |
|---------->|
| | -------------------------\
| |-| sk2, pk2 = KeyGen() |
| | ss = Combine(pk1, sk2) |
| | |------------------------|
| |
| pk2|
|<----------|
-------------------------\ | |
| ss = Combine(pk2, sk1) |-| |
|------------------------| | |
| |
10.2. HPKE
HPKE (Hybrid public key encryption) [RFC9180] deals with a variant of
KEM which is essentially a PKE of arbitrary sized plaintexts for a
recipient public key. It works with a combination of KEMs, KDFs and
AEAD schemes (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data). HPKE
includes three authenticated variants, including one that
authenticates possession of a pre-shared key and two optional ones
that authenticate possession of a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)
private key. Kyber, which is a KEM does not support the static-
ephemeral key exchange that allows HPKE based on DH based KEMs its
(optional) authenticated modes as discussed in Section 1.2 of
[I-D.westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00-02].
10.3. Security property
* IND-CCA2 : IND-CCA2 (INDistinguishability under adaptive Chosen-
Ciphertext Attack) is an advanced security notion for encryption
schemes. It ensures the confidentiality of the plaintext,
resistance against chosen-ciphertext attacks, and prevents the
adversary from forging new ciphertexts. An appropriate definition
of IND-CCA2 security for KEMs can be found in [CS01] and [BHK09].
Kyber, Classic McEliece and Saber provide IND-CCA2 security.
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Understanding IND-CCA2 security is essential for individuals involved
in designing or implementing cryptographic systems to evaluate the
strength of the algorithm, assess its suitability for specific use
cases, and ensure that data confidentiality and security requirements
are met.
11. PQC Signatures
11.1. What is a Post-quantum Signature
Any digital signature scheme that provides a construction defining
security under post quantum setting falls under this category of PQ
signatures.
11.2. Security property
* EUF-CMA : EUF-CMA (Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message
Attack) [GMR88] is a security notion for digital signature
schemes. It guarantees that an adversary, even with access to a
signing oracle, cannot forge a valid signature for an arbitrary
message. EUF-CMA provides strong protection against forgery
attacks, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of digital
signatures by preventing unauthorized modifications or fraudulent
signatures. Dilithium, Falcon and Sphincs+ provide EUF-CMA
security.
Understanding EUF-CMA security is essential for individual involved
in designing or implementing cryptographic systems to ensure the
security, reliability, and trustworthiness of digital signature
schemes. It allows for informed decision-making, vulnerability
analysis, compliance with standards, and designing systems that
provide strong protection against forgery attacks.
11.3. Details of FALCON, Dilithium, and SPHINCS+
Dilithium [Dilithium] is a digital signature algorithm (part of the
CRYSTALS suite) based on the hardness lattice problems over module
lattices (i.e., the Module Learning with Errors problem(MLWE)). The
design of the algorithm is based on Fiat Shamir with Abort method
that leverages rejection sampling to render lattice based FS schemes
compact and secure. Additionally, Dilithium offers both
deterministic and randomized signing. Security properties of
Dilithium are discussed in Section 9 of
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates].
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Falcon [Falcon] is based on the GPV hash-and-sign lattice-based
signature framework introduced by Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan,
which is a framework that requires a class of lattices and a trapdoor
sampler technique.
The main design principle of Falcon is compactness, i.e. it was
designed in a way that achieves minimal total memory bandwidth
requirement (the sum of the signature size plus the public key size).
This is possible due to the compactness of NTRU lattices. Falcon
also offers very efficient signing and verification procedures. The
main potential downsides of Falcon refer to the non-triviality of its
algorithms and the need for floating point arithmetic support.
Access to a robust floating-point stack in Falcon is essential for
accurate, efficient, and secure execution of the mathematical
computations involved in the scheme. It helps maintain precision,
supports error correction techniques, and contributes to the overall
reliability and performance of Falcon's cryptographic operations as
well makes it more resistant to side-channel attacks.
Falcon's signing operations require constant-time, 64-bit floating
point operations to avoid catastrophic side channel vulnerabilities.
Doing this correctly (which is also platform-dependent to an extreme
degree) is very difficult, as NIST's report noted. Providing a
masked implementation of Falcon also seems impossible, per the
authors at the RWPQC 2023 symposium earlier this year.
The performance characteristics of Dilithium and Falcon may differ
based on the specific implementation and hardware platform.
Generally, Dilithium is known for its relatively fast signature
generation, while Falcon can provide more efficient signature
verification. The choice may depend on whether the application
requires more frequent signature generation or signature
verification. For further clarity, please refer to the tables in
sections Section 12 and Section 13.
SPHINCS+ [SPHINCS] utilizes the concept of stateless hash-based
signatures, where each signature is unique and unrelated to any
previous signature (as discussed in Section 9.2). This property
eliminates the need for maintaining state information during the
signing process. SPHINCS+ was designed to sign up to 2^64 messages
and it offers three security levels. The parameters for each of the
security levels were chosen to provide 128 bits of security, 192 bits
of security, and 256 bits of security. SPHINCS+ offers smaller key
sizes, larger signature sizes, slower signature generation, and
slower verification when compared to Dilithium and Falcon. SPHINCS+
does not introduce a new intractability assumption. It builds upon
established foundations in cryptography, making it a reliable and
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robust digital signature scheme for a post-quantum world. The
advantages and disadvantages of SPHINCS+ over other signature
algorithms is disussed in Section 3.1 of
[I-D.draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus].
11.4. Details of XMSS and LMS
The eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [RFC8391] and Leighton-
Micali Signature (LMS) [RFC8554] are stateful hash-based signature
schemes, where the secret key changes over time. In both schemes,
reusing a secret key state compromises cryptographic security
guarantees.
Multi-Tree XMSS and LMS can be used for signing a potentially large
but fixed number of messages and the number of signing operations
depends upon the size of the tree. XMSS and LMS provide
cryptographic digital signatures without relying on the conjectured
hardness of mathematical problems, instead leveraging the properties
of cryptographic hash functions. XMSS and Hierarchical Signature
System (HSS) use a hierarchical approach with a Merkle tree at each
level of the hierarchy. [RFC8391] describes both single-tree and
multi-tree variants of XMSS, while [RFC8554] describes the Leighton-
Micali One-Time Signature (LM-OTS) system as well as the LMS and HSS
N-time signature systems. Comparison of XMSS and LMS is discussed in
Section 10 of [RFC8554].
The number of tree layers in XMSS^MT provides a trade-off between
signature size on the one side and key generation and signing speed
on the other side. Increasing the number of layers reduces key
generation time exponentially and signing time linearly at the cost
of increasing the signature size linearly.
XMSS and LMS can be applied in various scenarios where digital
signatures are required, such as software updates.
11.5. Hash-then-Sign Versus Sign-then-Hash
Within the hash-then-sign paradigm, the message is hashed before
signing it. Hashing the message before signing it provides an
additional layer of security by ensuring that only a fixed-size
digest of the message is signed, rather than the entire message
itself. By pre-hashing, the onus of resistance to existential
forgeries becomes heavily reliant on the collision-resistance of the
hash function in use. As well as this security goal, the hash-then-
sign paradigm also has the ability to improve performance by reducing
the size of signed messages. As a corollary, hashing remains
mandatory even for short messages and assigns a further computational
requirement onto the verifier. This makes the performance of hash-
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then-sign schemes more consistent, but not necessarily more
efficient. Using a hash function to produce a fixed-size digest of a
message ensures that the signature is compatible with a wide range of
systems and protocols, regardless of the specific message size or
format. Hash-then-Sign also greatly reduces the amount of data that
needs to be processed by a hardware security module, which sometimes
have somewhat limited data processing capabilities.
Protocols like TLS 1.3 and DNSSEC use the Hash-then-Sign paradigm.
TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] uses it in the Certificate Verify to proof that the
endpoint possesses the private key corresponding to its certificate,
while DNSSEC [RFC4033] uses it to provide origin authentication and
integrity assurance services for DNS data.
In the case of Dilithium, it internally incorporates the necessary
hash operations as part of its signing algorithm. Dilithium directly
takes the original message, applies a hash function internally, and
then uses the resulting hash value for the signature generation
process. In case of SPHINCS+, it internally performs randomized
message compression using a keyed hash function that can process
arbitrary length messages. In case of Falcon, a hash function is
used as part of the signature process, it uses the SHAKE-256 hash
function to derive a digest of the message being signed. Therefore,
the hash-then-sign paradigm is not needed for Dilithium, SPHINCS+ and
Falcon.
12. Recommendations for Security / Performance Tradeoffs
The table below denotes the 5 security levels provided by NIST
required for PQC algorithms. Users can leverage the required
algorithm based on the security level based on their use case. The
security is defined as a function of resources required to break AES
and SHA2/SHA3 algorithms, i.e., exhaustive key recovery for AES and
optimal collision search for SHA2/SHA3.
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+=============+===========================+========================+
| PQ Security | AES/SHA(2/3) hardness | PQC Algorithm |
| Level | | |
+=============+===========================+========================+
| 1 | Atleast as hard as to | Kyber512, Falcon512, |
| | break AES-128 (exhaustive | Sphincs+SHA-256 128f/s |
| | key recovery) | |
+-------------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| 2 | Atleast as hard as to | Dilithium2 |
| | break SHA-256/SHA3-256 | |
| | (collision search) | |
+-------------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| 3 | Atleast as hard as to | Kyber768, Dilithium3, |
| | break AES-192 (exhaustive | Sphincs+SHA-256 192f/s |
| | key recovery) | |
+-------------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| 4 | Atleast as hard as to | No algorithm tested at |
| | break SHA-384/SHA3-384 | this level |
| | (collision search) | |
+-------------+---------------------------+------------------------+
| 5 | Atleast as hard as to | Kyber1024, Falcon1024, |
| | break AES-256 (exhaustive | Dilithium5, |
| | key recovery) | Sphincs+SHA-256 256f/s |
+-------------+---------------------------+------------------------+
Table 1
Please note the Sphincs+SHA-256 x"f/s" in the above table denotes
whether its the Sphincs+ fast (f) version or small (s) version for
"x" bit AES security level. Refer to
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-02] for further details on Sphincs+
algorithms.
The following table discusses the signature size differences for
similar SPHINCS+ algorithm security levels with the "simple" version
but for different categories i.e., (f) for fast verification and (s)
for compactness/smaller. Both SHA-256 and SHAKE-256 parametrisation
output the same signature sizes, so both have been included.
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+==========+============================+======+=======+===========+
| PQ | Algorithm |Public|Private| Signature |
| Security | |key |key | size (in |
| Level | |size |size | bytes) |
| | |(in |(in | |
| | |bytes)|bytes) | |
+==========+============================+======+=======+===========+
| 1 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-128f |32 |64 | 17088 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
| 1 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-128s |32 |64 | 7856 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
| 3 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-192f |48 |96 | 35664 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
| 3 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-192s |48 |96 | 16224 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
| 5 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-256f |64 |128 | 49856 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
| 5 | SPHINCS+-{SHA2,SHAKE}-256s |64 |128 | 29792 |
+----------+----------------------------+------+-------+-----------+
Table 2
The following table discusses the impact of performance on different
security levels in terms of private key sizes, public key sizes and
ciphertext/signature sizes.
+==========+============+============+============+================+
| PQ | Algorithm | Public key | Private | Ciphertext/ |
| Security | | size (in | key size | Signature size |
| Level | | bytes) | (in bytes) | (in bytes) |
+==========+============+============+============+================+
| 1 | Kyber512 | 800 | 1632 | 768 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
| 1 | Falcon512 | 897 | 1281 | 666 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
| 2 | Dilithium2 | 1312 | 2528 | 2420 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
| 3 | Kyber768 | 1184 | 2400 | 1088 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
| 5 | Falcon1024 | 1793 | 2305 | 1280 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
| 5 | Kyber1024 | 1568 | 3168 | 1588 |
+----------+------------+------------+------------+----------------+
Table 3
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13. Comparing PQC KEMs/Signatures vs Traditional KEMs (KEXs)/Signatures
In this section, we provide two tables for comparison of different
KEMs and Signatures respectively, in the traditional and Post
scenarios. These tables will focus on the secret key sizes, public
key sizes, and ciphertext/signature sizes for the PQC algorithms and
their traditional counterparts of similar security levels.
The first table compares traditional vs. PQC KEMs in terms of
security, public, private key sizes, and ciphertext sizes.
+=============+=====================+========+=========+============+
| PQ Security | Algorithm | Public | Private | Ciphertext |
| Level | | key | key | size (in |
| | | size | size | bytes) |
| | | (in | (in | |
| | | bytes) | bytes) | |
+=============+=====================+========+=========+============+
| Traditional | P256_HKDF_SHA-256 | 65 | 32 | 65 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
| Traditional | P521_HKDF_SHA-512 | 133 | 66 | 133 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
| Traditional | X25519_HKDF_SHA-256 | 32 | 32 | 32 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
| 1 | Kyber512 | 800 | 1632 | 768 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
| 3 | Kyber768 | 1184 | 2400 | 1088 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
| 5 | Kyber1024 | 1568 | 3168 | 1588 |
+-------------+---------------------+--------+---------+------------+
Table 4
The next table compares traditional vs. PQC Signature schemes in
terms of security, public, private key sizes, and signature sizes.
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+=============+============+============+============+===========+
| PQ Security | Algorithm | Public key | Private | Signature |
| Level | | size (in | key size | size (in |
| | | bytes) | (in bytes) | bytes) |
+=============+============+============+============+===========+
| Traditional | RSA2048 | 256 | 256 | 256 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| Traditional | P256 | 64 | 32 | 64 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| 1 | Falcon512 | 897 | 1281 | 666 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| 2 | Dilithium2 | 1312 | 2528 | 768 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| 3 | Dilithium3 | 1952 | 4000 | 3293 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
| 5 | Falcon1024 | 1793 | 2305 | 1280 |
+-------------+------------+------------+------------+-----------+
Table 5
As one can clearly observe from the above tables, leveraging a PQC
KEM/Signature significantly increases the key sizes and the
ciphertext/signature sizes as well as compared to traditional
KEM(KEX)/Signatures. But the PQC algorithms do provide the
additional security level in case there is an attack from a CRQC,
whereas schemes based on prime factorization or discrete logarithm
problems (finite field or elliptic curves) would provide no level of
security at all against such attacks.
14. Post-Quantum and Traditional Hybrid Schemes
The migration to PQC is unique in the history of modern digital
cryptography in that neither the traditional algorithms nor the post-
quantum algorithms are fully trusted to protect data for the required
lifetimes. The traditional algorithms, such as RSA and elliptic
curve, will fall to quantum cryptalanysis, while the post-quantum
algorithms face uncertainty about the underlying mathematics,
compliance issues, unknown vulnerabilities, and hardware and software
implementations that have not had sufficient maturing time to rule
out classical cryptanalytic attacks and implementation bugs.
During the transition from traditional to post-quantum algorithms,
there may be a desire or a requirement for protocols that use both
algorithm types. [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology] defines the
terminology for the Post-Quantum and Traditional Hybrid Schemes.
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14.1. PQ/T Hybrid Confidentiality
The PQ/T Hybrid Confidentiality property can be used to protect from
a "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" attack, which refers to an attacker
collecting encrypted data now and waiting for quantum computers to
become powerful enough to break the encryption later. Two types of
hybrid key agreement schemes are discussed below:
1. Concatenate hybrid key agreement scheme: The final shared secret
that will be used as an input of the key derivation function is
the result of the concatenation of the secrets established with
each key agreement scheme. For example, in
[I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], the client uses the TLS supported
groups extension to advertise support for a PQ/T hybrid scheme,
and the server can select this group if it supports the scheme.
The hybrid-aware client and server establish a hybrid secret by
concatenating the two shared secrets, which is used as the shared
secret in the existing TLS 1.3 key schedule.
2. Cascade hybrid key agreement scheme: The final shared secret is
computed by applying as many iterations of the key derivation
function as the number of key agreement schemes composing the
hybrid key agreement scheme. For example, [RFC9370] extends the
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) to allow one or
more PQC algorithms in addition to the traditional algorithm to
derive the final IKE SA keys using the cascade method as
explained in Section 2.2.2 of [RFC9370].
14.2. PQ/T Hybrid Authentication
The PQ/T Hybrid Authentication property can be utilized in scenarios
where an on-path attacker possesses network devices equipped with
CRQCs, capable of breaking traditional authentication protocols.
This property ensures authentication through a PQ/T hybrid scheme or
a PQ/T hybrid protocol, as long as at least one component algorithm
remains secure to provide the intended security level. For instance,
a PQ/T hybrid certificate can be employed to facilitate a PQ/T hybrid
authentication protocol. However, a PQ/T hybrid authentication
protocol does not need to use a PQ/T hybrid certificate
[I-D.ounsworth-pq-composite-keys]; separate certificates could be
used for individual component algorithms
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth].
The frequency and duration of system upgrades and the time when CRQCs
will become widely available need to be weighed in to determine
whether and when to support the PQ/T Hybrid Authentication property.
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14.3. Additional Considerations
It is also possible to use more than two algorithms together in a
hybrid scheme, and there are multiple possible ways those algorithms
can be combined. For the purposes of a post-quantum transition, the
simple combination of a post-quantum algorithm with a single
classical algorithm is the most straightforward, but the use of
multiple post-quantum algorithms with different hard math problems
has also been considered. When combining algorithms, it is possible
to require that both algorithms validate (the so-called "and" mode)
or that only one does (the "or" mode), or even some more complicated
scheme. Schemes that do not require both algorithms to validate only
have the strength of the weakest algorithm, and therefore offer
little or no security benefit. Since such schemes generally also
require both keys to be distributed (e.g.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-
hybrid-x509-01), there are substantial performance costs in some
scenarios. This combination of properties makes optionally including
post-quantum keys without requiring their use to be generally
unattractive in most use cases.
When combining keys in an "and" mode, it may make more sense to
consider them to be a single composite key, instead of two keys.
This generally requires fewer changes to various components of PKI
ecosystems, many of which are not prepared to deal with two keys or
dual signatures. To them, a "composite" algorithm composed of two
other algorithms is simply a new algorithm, and support for adding
new algorithms generally already exists. All that needs to be done
is to standardize the formats of how the two keys from the two
algorithms are combined into a single data structure, and how the two
resulting signatures are combined into a single signature. The
answer can be as simple as concatenation, if the lengths are fixed or
easily determined.
One last consideration is the pairs of algorithms that can be
combined. A recent trends in protocols is to only allow a small
number of "known good" configurations that make sense, instead of
allowing arbitrary combinations of individual configuration choices
that may interact in dangerous ways. The current consensus is that
the same approach should be followed for combining cryptographic
algorithms, and that "known good" pairs should be explicitly listed
("explicit composite"), instead of just allowing arbitrary
combinations of any two crypto algorithms ("generic composite").
The same considerations apply when using multiple certificates to
transport a pair of related keys for the same subject. Exactly how
two certificates should be managed in order to avoid some of the
pitfalls mentioned above is still an active area of investigation.
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Using two certificates keeps the certificate tooling simple and
straightforward, but in the end simply moves the problems with
requiring that both certs are intended to be used as a pair, and both
must validate, to the certificate management layer, where they still
need to be addressed.
At least one scheme has been proposed that allows the pair of
certificates to exist as a single certificate when being issued and
managed, but dynamically split into individual certificates when
needed (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bonnell-lamps-
chameleon-certs/).
Many of these points are still being actively explored and discussed,
and the consensus may change over time.
15. Security Considerations
15.1. Cryptanalysis
Classical cryptanalysis exploits weaknesses in algorithm design,
mathematical vulnerabilities, or implementation flaws, whereas
quantum cryptanalysis harnesses the power of CRQCs to solve specific
mathematical problems more efficiently. Both pose threats to the
security of cryptographic algorithms, including those used in PQC.
Developing and adopting new cryptographic algorithms resilient
against these threats is crucial for ensuring long-term security in
the face of advancing cryptanalysis techniques. Recent attacks on
the side-channel implementations using deep learning based power
analysis have also shown that one needs to be cautious while
implementing the required PQC algorithms in hardware. Two of the
most recent works include: one attack on Kyber [KyberSide] and one
attack on Saber [SaberSide]. Evolving threat landscape points to the
fact that lattice based cryptography is indeed more vulnerable to
side-channel attacks as in [SideCh], [LatticeSide]. Consequently,
there were some mitigation techniques for side channel attacks that
have been proposed as in [Mitigate1], [Mitigate2], and [Mitigate3].
15.2. Cryptographic Agility
Cryptographic agility is relevant for both classical and quantum
cryptanalysis as it enables organizations to adapt to emerging
threats, adopt stronger algorithms, comply with standards, and plan
for long-term security in the face of evolving cryptanalytic
techniques and the advent of CRQCs. Several PQC schemes are
available that need to be tested; cryptography experts around the
world are pushing for the best possible solutions, and the first
standards that will ease the introduction of PQC are being prepared.
It is of paramount importance and a call for imminent action for
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organizations, bodies, and enterprises to start evaluating their
cryptographic agility, assess the complexity of implementing PQC into
their products, processes, and systems, and develop a migration plan
that achieves their security goals to the best possible extent.
15.3. Hybrid Key Exchange : Bridging the Gap Between Post-Quantum and
Traditional Cryptography
Post-quantum algorithms selected for standardization are relatively
new and they they have not been subject to the same depth of study as
traditional algorithms. In addition, certain deployments may need to
retain traditional algorithms due to regulatory constraints, for
example FIPS compliance. Hybrid key exchange enables potential
security against "Harvest Now, Decrypt Later" attack while not fully
abandoning traditional cryptosystems.
16. Further Reading & Resources
16.1. Reading List
(A reading list. Serious Cryptography (https://nostarch.com/
seriouscrypto). Pointers to PQC sites with good explanations. List
of reasonable Wikipedia pages.)
16.2. Developer Resources
* Open Quantum Safe (https://openquantumsafe.org/) and corresponding
github (https://github.com/open-quantum-safe)
17. Contributors
The following individuals have contributed to this document:
Kris Kwiatkowski
PQShield, LTD
United Kingdom.
kris@amongbytes.com
Acknowledgements
It leverages text from https://github.com/paulehoffman/post-quantum-
for-engineers/blob/main/pqc-for-engineers.md. Thanks to Dan Wing,
Florence D, Thom Wiggers, Sophia Grundner-Culemann, Sofia Celi,
Melchior Aelmans, and Falko Strenzke for the discussion, review and
comments.
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References
Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[RFC8391] Huelsing, A., Butin, D., Gazdag, S., Rijneveld, J., and A.
Mohaisen, "XMSS: eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme",
RFC 8391, DOI 10.17487/RFC8391, May 2018,
.
[RFC8554] McGrew, D., Curcio, M., and S. Fluhrer, "Leighton-Micali
Hash-Based Signatures", RFC 8554, DOI 10.17487/RFC8554,
April 2019, .
Informative References
[BHK09] "Subtleties in the Definition of IND-CCA: When and How
Should Challenge-Decryption be Disallowed?",
.
[Cloudflare]
"NIST’s pleasant post-quantum surprise",
.
[CNSA2-0] "Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm
Suite 2.0", .
[CS01] "Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption
Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack",
.
[Dilithium]
"Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices (CRYSTALS) -
Dilithium",
.
[Falcon] "Fast Fourier lattice-based compact signatures over NTRU",
.
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[GMR88] "A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive
chosen-message attacks.",
.
[Google] "Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting
Processor", .
[Grover-search]
"C. Zalka, “Grover’s quantum searching algorithm is
optimal,” Physical Review A, vol. 60, pp. 2746-2751,
1999.".
[I-D.draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus]
Prorock, M., Steele, O., Misoczki, R., Osborne, M., and C.
Cloostermans, "JOSE and COSE Encoding for SPHINCS+", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-sphincs-plus-
01, 9 July 2023, .
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth]
Becker, A., Guthrie, R., and M. J. Jenkins, "Related
Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a
Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-01, 26 June 2023,
.
[I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-02]
Housley, R., Fluhrer, S., Kampanakis, P., and B.
Westerbaan, "Use of the SPHINCS+ Signature Algorithm in
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-cms-sphincs-plus-02, 17
May 2023, .
[I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Algorithm Identifiers for Dilithium", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-
02, 7 August 2023, .
Banerjee, et al. Expires 11 February 2024 [Page 28]
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[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]
D, F., "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid
Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-00, 4 May 2023,
.
[I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key
exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-06, 27 February 2023,
.
[I-D.ounsworth-pq-composite-keys]
Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., and J. Klaußner,
"Composite Public and Private Keys For Use In Internet
PKI", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ounsworth-
pq-composite-keys-05, 29 May 2023,
.
[I-D.westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00-02]
Westerbaan, B. and C. A. Wood, "X25519Kyber768Draft00
hybrid post-quantum KEM for HPKE", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-westerbaan-cfrg-hpke-xyber768d00-02,
4 May 2023, .
[IBM] "IBM Unveils 400 Qubit-Plus Quantum Processor and Next-
Generation IBM Quantum System Two",
.
[IBMRoadmap]
"The IBM Quantum Development Roadmap",
.
[KyberSide]
"A Side-Channel Attack on a Hardware Implementation of
CRYSTALS-Kyber", .
[LattFail1]
"Decryption Failure Attacks on IND-CCA Secure Lattice-
Based Schemes", .
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[LattFail2]
"(One) Failure Is Not an Option: Bootstrapping the Search
for Failures in Lattice-Based Encryption Schemes.",
.
[LatticeSide]
"Generic Side-channel attacks on CCA-secure lattice-based
PKE and KEM schemes", .
[Mitigate1]
"POLKA: Towards Leakage-Resistant Post-Quantum CCA-Secure
Public Key Encryption",
.
[Mitigate2]
"Leakage-Resilient Certificate-Based Authenticated Key
Exchange Protocol",
.
[Mitigate3]
"Post-Quantum Authenticated Encryption against Chosen-
Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks",
.
[NIST] "Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization",
.
[Nokia] "Interference Measurements of Non-Abelian e/4 & Abelian
e/2 Quasiparticle Braiding",
.
[PQCAPI] "PQC - API notes",
.
[QC-DNS] "Quantum Computing and the DNS",
.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
.
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[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, .
[RFC9370] Tjhai, CJ., Tomlinson, M., Bartlett, G., Fluhrer, S., Van
Geest, D., Garcia-Morchon, O., and V. Smyslov, "Multiple
Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9370, DOI 10.17487/RFC9370, May
2023, .
[RSA] "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key
Cryptosystems+",
.
[RSA10SC] "Breaking RSA Encryption - an Update on the State-of-the-
Art", .
[RSA8HRS] "How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20
million noisy qubits", .
[SaberSide]
"A side-channel attack on a masked and shuffled software
implementation of Saber",
.
[SideCh] "Side-Channel Attacks on Lattice-Based KEMs Are Not
Prevented by Higher-Order Masking",
.
[SPHINCS] "SPHINCS+", .
[Threat-Report]
"Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2020",
.
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Authors' Addresses
Aritra Banerjee
Nokia
Munich
Germany
Email: aritra.banerjee@nokia.com
Tirumaleswar Reddy
Nokia
Bangalore
Karnataka
India
Email: kondtir@gmail.com
Dimitrios Schoinianakis
Nokia
Athens
Greece
Email: dimitrios.schoinianakis@nokia-bell-labs.com
Timothy Hollebeek
DigiCert
Pittsburgh,
United States of America
Email: tim.hollebeek@digicert.com
Banerjee, et al. Expires 11 February 2024 [Page 32]