An I2NSF Framework for Security Management Automation in Cloud-Based Security Systems

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework and interfaces for interacting with Network Security Functions (NSFs) [RFC8192][RFC8329]. Note that an NSF is defined as software that provides a set of security-related services, such as (i) detecting unwanted activity, (ii) blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfill service requirements, and (iii) supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality [RFC8329]. The NSF can be implemented as a Virtual Network Function (VNF) in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment [ETSI-NFV][I-D.ietf-i2nsf-applicability].¶

This document describes Security Management Automation (SMA) of cloud-based security services in the I2NSF framework. The security management automation includes closed-loop security control, security policy translation, and security audit. This document specifies an augmented architecture of the I2NSF framework for the SMA services with new system components and new interfaces.¶

For reliable management for networked security services, this document proposes a network management and verification facility using a secuirty audit system (e.g., remote attestation and blockchain [Bitcoin]). This security audit system can facilitate the non-repudiation of configuration commands and monitoring data generated in the I2NSF framework.¶

Therefore, the Security Management Automation (SMA) in this document can facilitate Intent-Based Security Management with Intent-Based Networking (IBN) in [RFC9315] for autonomous security services.¶

Note that the scope of this document is to propose an extension of the standard I2NSF framework in [RFC8329] such that it can perform security management automation based on Intent-Based Networking (IBN) in [RFC9315]. This document augments the existing I2NSF framework by adding the new features of security policy translation, closed-loop security control, and security audit system to it. For this system augmentation, a system component called I2NSF Analyzer and a new external interface called Analytics Interface are introduced for Closed-Loop Security Control on the basis of the analysis of NSF monitoring data. This monitoring data is delivered from each NSF to I2NSF Analyzer via Monitoring Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-monitoring-data-model]. I2NSF Analyzer performs the analysis of the NSF monitoring data, and sends the analysis results (e.g., policy reconfiguration and feedback message) to Security Controller via Analytics Interface. For more details, Refer to Section 3 in this document.¶

Also, note that Cloud or Edge-based Security Service Providers can get benefits by automating security service management in terms of automatic security policy enforcement and feedback-based security policy updates. Eventually, they can save Operational Expenditure (OPEX) significantly by this Intent-Based Security Management with Intent-Based Networking (IBN) in [RFC9315].¶

2. Terminology

This document uses the terminology described in [RFC8329], [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-applicability], and [SPT]. In addition, the following terms are defined below:¶

• Security Management Automation (SMA): It means that a high-level security policy from a user (or administrator) is well-enforced in a target I2NSF system. The high-level security policy can be translated into the corresponding low-level security policy by a security policy translator and dispatched to appropriate NSFs. Through the monitoring of the NSFs, the activity and performace of the NSFs is monitored and analyzed. If needed, the security rules of the low-level security policy are augmented or new security rules are generated and configured to appropriate NSFs.¶

• Security Policy Translation: It means that a high-level security from an I2NSF User (e.g., administrator) policy is translated to a low-level security policy that can be understood and configured by an NSF for a specific security service, such as firewall, web filter, deep packet inspection, DDoS-attack mitigation, and anti-virus. A Security Policy Translator (SPT) performs this security policy translation for the sake for the I2NSF User [SPT]. This SPT is an subcomponent of Security Controller which is a main component to govern the I2NSF Framework.¶

• Feedback-Based Security Management (FSM): It means that a security service is evolved by updating a security policy (having security rules) and adding new security rules for detected security attacks by processing and analzing the monitoring data of NSFs.¶

3. An I2NSF Framework for Security Management Automation

This section describes an extended I2NSF framework for security management automation, where the I2NSF framework is defined in in [RFC8329]. As shown in Figure 1, an I2NSF User can use security functions by delivering high-level security policies, which specify security requirements that the I2NSF user wants to enforce, to the Security Controller via the Consumer-Facing Interface (CFI) [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm].¶

   +------------+
   | I2NSF User |
   +------------+
          ^
          | Consumer-Facing Interface
          v
+-------------------+     Registration     +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgmt System|
+-------------------+      Interface       +-----------------------+
          ^      ^
          |      |
          |      |   Analytics Interface   +-----------------------+
          |      +------------------------>|    I2NSF Analyzer     |
          |                                +-----------------------+
          | NSF-Facing Interface              ^       ^       ^
          |                                   |       |       |
          |                                   |       |       |
          |    +------------------------------+       |       |
          |    |              +-----------------------+       |
          |    |              |   Monitoring Interface        |
          v    v              v                               v
   +----------------+ +---------------+   +-----------------------+
   |      NSF-1     |-|     NSF-2     |...|         NSF-n         |
   |   (Firewall)   | | (Web Filter)  |   |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
   +----------------+ +---------------+   +-----------------------+

4. Security Audit System

The I2NSF framework is weak to both an insider attack and a supply chain attack since it trusts in NSFs provided by Developer's Management System (DMS) and assumes that NSFs work for their security services appropriately [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-applicability].¶

To detect the malicious activity of either an insider attack by a malicious DMS or a supply chain attack by a compromised DMS, a security audit system is required by the I2NSF framework. This security audit system can facilitate the non-repudiation of configuration commands and monitoring data generated in the I2NSF framework.¶

A security audit system has the following four main objectives:¶

• To check the existence of a security policy, a management system, and its procedures;¶

• To identify and understand the existing vulnerabilities and risks of either an insider attack or a supply chain attack;¶

• To review existing security controls on operational and administrative issues;¶

• To provide recommendations and corrective actions to Security Controller for further security improvement.¶

+-----------------------------+                   +----------------+
|         I2NSF User          |                   |Developer's Mgmt|
|                             +------------+      |     System     |
+--------------+--------------+            |      +--------+-------+
               | Consumer-Facing Interface |               |
               |                           |  Remote       |
   High-level Security Policy              |  Attestation  |
               |                           |  Interface    |
               |                           |               |
               V                           |               V
+--------------+--------------+            |     +---------+--------+
|                             |            V     |     Security     |
|     Security Controller     +------------+---->|       Audit      |
|                             |            ^     |      System      |
+--------------+--------------+            |     +---------+--------+
               |  NSF-Facing Interface     |               ^
               |                           |  Remote       |
   Low-level Security Policy               |  Attestation  |
               |                           |  Interface    |
               V                           |               |
+--------------+--------------+            |      +--------+-------+
|            NSF(s)           +------------+      | I2NSF Analyzer |
|                             +------------------>|                |
+-----------------------------+    Monitoring     +----------------+
                                   Interface

Figure 2 shows activity auditing with a security audit system in the I2NSF framework. All the components in the I2NSF framwork report its activities (such as configuration commands and monitoring data) to Security Audit System as transactions through Remote Attestation Interface [I-D.yang-i2nsf-remote-attestation-interface-dm]. The security audit system can analyze the reported activities from the I2NSF components to detect malicious activities such as an insider attack and a supply chain attack. Note that such a security audit system can be implemented by remote attestation [RFC9334][I-D.yang-i2nsf-remote-attestation-interface-dm] or Blockchain [Bitcoin]. The details of the implementation of the security audit system are out of the scope of this document.¶

In order to determine a minimum set of controls required to reduce the risks from either an insider attack or a supply chain attack, the security audit system should analyze the activities of all the components in the I2NSF framework periodically, evaluate possible risks, and take an action to such risks since vulnerabilities and threats may change in different environments over time.¶

5. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA actions.¶

6. Security Considerations

The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329] are applicable to this document.¶

The development and introduction of I2NSF Analyzer and Security Audit System in the I2NSF Framework may create new security concerns that have to be anticipated at the design and specification time. The usage of machine learning to analyze monitoring data of malicious NSFs may add a risk to its model to be attacked (e.g., adversarial attack) and can result in a bad security policy that is deployed into the I2NSF system.¶

Acknowledgments

This document benefited from discussions in the I2NSF Working Group, especially from Linda Dunbar and Yoav Nir. This document took advantage of the review and comments from the following experts: Qin Wu and Adrian Farrel. The authors sincerely appreciate their sincere efforts and kind help.¶

This work was supported by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT)(RS-2024-00398199).¶

This work was supported in part by Institute of Information & Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT)(No. 2022-0-01015, Development of Candidate Element Technology for Intelligent 6G Mobile Core Network).¶

Contributors

The following are coauthors of this document:¶

Authors' Addresses